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Introduction

A cosmos of one’s own: Faulkner conceived as early as the 1920s that his
unfolding fictions would come together in the guise of a coherent world.
As “sole owner and proprietor,” his would be the gaze that brings into
being such a world: Be Yoknapatawpha! is the vocative engendering the
creation. Gary Stonum and Eric Sundquist, among others, have exam
ined the pitfalls and betrayals attendant upon this generative masculine
ideal; and Faulkner’s commentators more broadly have remarked on the
unevenness of the career, the inconsistencies within its unfolding, and the
protracted sadness of its closing years.*
Like Balzac, but also like Sutpen, Faulkner would become a demigod,
drawing upon given historical materials but designing them in such a
way as to reveal no traces but his own - the writer’s own subjective
lineaments writ large in the lives and landscapes of his shaping. Such a
masculine urge toward self-ratification appears everywhere in the novels
themselves, aggressively in the dynastic ambitions of a Sartoris or McCaslin or Flem Snopes, but just as often defensively as the need for
sanctuary (a stay against “the maelstrom of unbearable reality” [AA 186]), or
as the intensifying narrative desire for completion: to say it all, now, in
one inclusive, ten-thousand-word sentence that would close the circle of
utterance. Say it now, while coherence - even if only an illusion of
memory and desire, an artifact of discourses approaching obsolescence is still intact, the abrasions of “Chinese and African and Aryan and Jew”
(GDM 364) still at bay. “My last book will be the Doomsday Book, the
> “Apocrypha” (Faulkner’s chosen word for the furthest reaches of his work; from the
actual “into the apocryphal” [Stein 82]) has been read by Joseph Urgo as signaling,
however unintentionally, the sense not of an orderly cosmos but of a transgressive space
where authority is in crisis. Martin Kreiswirth has recently commented on the di
achronic/dialogic impulse that generates Yoknapatawpha: “Faulkner is always breaking
what Derrida calls ‘the law of genre.’ ”
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Golden Book of Yoknapatawpha County. Then I shall break the pencil
and I’ll have to stop” (Stein 82).
Faulkner’s major novels are the ones in which this desire (imperial
or beleaguered) for self-ratifying clashes most urgently with the dif
ferential forces - shaped by politics, race, and gender - that would unseat
the coherence of the struggling male subject. In theme and form these
novels enact the invasion of the unknown into the precincts of the
familiar, and they suggest that such acts of self-constitution produce
a selfhood not sutured but splintered - a subjectivity irreparably fissured,
a cosmos no one owns. The goal of my study is to open up the di
mensions of that invasion and to remap the terrain of a subjectivity
requiring different terms for its reconstrual.^ I attend therefore to the
texts written between 1929 and 1942, the ones in which the pressures for
and against the acknowledgment of human being (in the writer, his char
acters, and his readers in the act of response) are most agonistically in
play.^
Put otherwise, Faulkner’s supreme novels are those in which the pro
ject of subjective coherence is under maximal stress. As I read him,
Faulkner was hurt into greatness. What Kristeva calls the “semiotic” those gaps and discontinuities in discourse that betoken , the subject’s
living struggle against the culture’s grids of Symbolic meaning - drives
the experimental novels and reveals a narratorial subjectivity profoundly
at odds with its conventional options.'* The self-ratifying he and his white
male protagonists require collides with and shatters against the alterities
that make up both his inner and his outer world - alterities that I shall
2 This remapping involves the use of a variety of contemporary discourses for thinking
about the fissured subject; Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian reflection on the subject
as constituted by ideology (a paradigm revised and further developed in Macherey,
Eagleton, and Jameson), Derridean deconstruction, Foucauldian commentary on the
subject as modeled by disciplinary practices, feminist critiques of the universalized male
model of subjectivity (articulated by Kristeva and Irigaray, expounded by Gallop, Rose,
and Moi), Bakhtin’s location of the subject as a site of dialogic encounter, Bourdieu’s
reading of the subject as one who activates the culture’s “habitus,” and finally Smith’s
revisionary critique of the current theoretical dismissal of the subject as an inescapably
mystified entity. I apologize for this slew of names at the outset, but insofar as they are
going genuinely to be used in the following chapters, it seems wise to introduce them
here.
3 Wadlington’s Reading Faulknerian Tragedy attends with great suppleness to this dimension
of the work.
“* Whenever Symbolic or Imaginary appears capitalized in this study, the meaning system
at work is Lacanian. I elaborate at some length upon Lacan’s terminology in Chapter 3,
but I might briefly indicate here the range of meanings I intend. Imaginary refers to the
dimension of experience that operates visually - through irrationally projected and introjected images in the spatial field - and that begins prior to entry into language. Symbolic
refers to the dimension of experience that operates within the field of language - the
learned networks of kinship and culture, of code and law - and that assumes centrality
after the Oedipal crisis. Both these sense-making registers begin in early childhood, and
they continue to inflect subjectivity in overlapping and conflicting ways throughout life.
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examine most fully in the form of women and blacks. From the intensity
of this collision come the precious texts.
My “own” criterion of value (my reason for preferring this handful of
novels) registers a Modernist sensibility opened to a Postmodernist cri
tique. Faulkner’s brilliantly unruly early texts pass on to us (into us) the
visceral assault of culture upon the subject. In their savage refusal to uplift
- their continuous ironies — these novels creatively expose as unworkable
the larger culture’s ideological designs. Despite a current critical move to
rebuke Modernism for the blindnesses preserved within this stance of
“seeing through everything,” I continue to locate Faulkner’s most memo
rable achievement within such a stance of rebellious experimentation.
Arguing for his Modernist texts as both the locus of his value and the
gauge against which we can read the rest of the career, I seek to identify
the implicit (and broadly shared) cultural discourses that, by enabling this
cosmos, keep him from ever mastering it as “his own.” The Postmodern
dimension of this inquiry resides in my attempt to understand the neces
sary comphcities — the cultural norms and linguistic resources, the posi
tioning of the white male subject in relation to women and blacks - that
permit subjective identity, that allow Faulkner to enter the field of dis
course and become “Faulkner.”
If these are the texts in which the author most risked his authority, they
are also the ones in whose name, over time, he has most obtained his
authority. The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, and
Go Down, Moses have enjoyed canonical status for some forty years now.^
What larger cultural arrangements do they openly contest or implicitly
endorse, such that we (the literary establishment) have institutionalized
them, made them into Faulkner’s “signature,” even as, in their hazardous
activities, they call the coherence of any signature into question? Why,
especially, do we turn to The Sound and the Fury as not only Faulkner’s
“heart’s darling” but ours too? I shall address these questions indirectly
throughout the following chapters and explicitly in the conclusion, but
my aim is less to puncture than to understand these novels’ claims to
canonicity. Indeed, The Sound and the Fury has been for me, ever since I
encountered it in 1960, the supreme American novel of our century. This
study is inconceivable without that prior affection, yet I could never have
written it without assenting and responding to cumulative pressures
(provoked by critical theory) upon such a protected icon of value. The
sanctuary at stake in this book — the subjectivity under scrutiny — bears
my name as much as Faulkner’s.
5 1 omit As I Lay Dying from this scrutiny because so much of its representative quality is
shared with The Sound and the Fury. My larger purpose is not to justify canonical ex
clusiveness but “repercussively” to interrogate Faulkner’s practice within a limited (but
not privileged) frame.
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I propose to treat this double interrogation (of Faulkner’s coherent
subjectivity, of my own) not as embarrassing but as enabling. Assign
ments of literary value involve simultaneously the writer’s work, the
productive and the receptive cultures’ aesthetic politics, and the reader’s
subjective positioning with respect to these economies. None of these
orientations is simply given, all of them invite inquiry. I shall address the
four novels identified above as among Faulkner’s finest and as prob
lematic sites on which the higher culture has registered its imprimatur.
Further, I shall accord the form of The Sound and the Fury canonical status
within my own study, for I propose, Faulkner-fashion, to treat these four
novels as he came at the Compson materials: by approaching them (as a
group) four different times and with four sets of competing questions.
Such a dialogic strategy privileges difference itself, allowing each lens to
produce what it produces as I revisit the same (but never the same)
terrain. Faulkner is a supremely perspectival novelist - or a “repercussive” one - and it seems right to frame the theoretical issues that most
call into question his “signature” within a dialogic form that virtually
constitutes his “signature.”
Repercussive I call him, and my book is likewise repercussive, al
ways returning, though the place alters not just under a different set of
lenses but in accord with the differing times of my visit. This diachronic
dimension is, indeed, wrought into all writing. We would, like Faulkner,
say it all in one monstrous sentence,^ yet the fate of writing is that it
proceeds in time and the mind alters during the time of the proceeding.
“It is because writing is inaugural,” Derrida writes, “that it is dangerous
and anguishing. It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can
keep it from the essential precipitation toward the meaning that it con
stitutes and that is, primarily, its future. There is thus no insurance
against the risk of writing” (“Force” 11). This small scandal - the aleato
ry hallmark of all protracted writing - is what we seek to cover up as we
revise, and I have sought in this book both to acknowledge the scandal
and to make it productive. I have revised, but not with the illusion that
my text can become seamless, its argument synchronically complete. So
the chapters deliberately retain some of the flavor of their original impe
tus. I aim for dialogic interactions, not the authority of a magisterial
synthesis. This is not a cosmos I can own.
I have claimed that the critical issues I explore in this book problematize Faulkner’s “signature,” and I mean by this more than the fact
that his identity as a writer alters in time. It also alters according to the
discursive options available to (and chosen by) him for pursuing it. No
writer simply delivers into a neutral language his achieved identity: his
self-engendered sense of “how it is” in here and out there. Perhaps the
* John Irwin candidly reveals this fantasy in the opening pages

oCDoubling and Incest,

9.

A COSMOS NO ONE OWNS

5

most far-reaching Western intellectual claim of our century is that be
tween self and world there intervenes discourse, and that discourse in
flects both self and world. Benjamin Lee Whorf writes:

'

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do
not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions
which has to be organized in our minds - and this means largely by the
linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize into con
cepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties
to an agreement to organize it in this way — an agreement that holds
throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our
language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but
its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscrib
ing to the organization and classification of data to which the agreement
subscribes. (213)

Implicit and obligatory, the agreement we are party to is most
efficacious in our ongoing ignorance of it. Like Moliere’s M. Jourdain
who can hardly believe that it is prose that he speaks, we daily participate
unawares in the most intricate arrangements the moment we draw upon
language. Foucault’s epistemological work stems directly from this con
viction and from a desire to revise - by exposing - its implications. “I
would like to show with precise examples,” he writes in The Archaeology
of Knowledge, “that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the
loosening of the embrace ... of words and things, and the emergence of
a group of rules proper to discursive practices. These rules define not the
dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the
ordering of objects” (48—9). The words do not attach to the things; they
sketch out instead the languag^ game in play, the discursive practice’s
systemic way of ordering its objects.
The order arrived at, because it is produced in language, can only be
contestable. The unutterable truth is alone serene; it lives as inarticulable
doxa. But once it becomes encoded, enters language, it is available for
dispute. Orthodoxy is no more than the desperate battle to resist hetero
doxy. As the homely analogy of the orthodontist makes clear, orthodoxy
seeks to straighten the doxa, and this effort (which is undertaken only
when things have gone crooked) can be both strenuous and painful.
Pierre Bourdieu writes: “Orthodoxy, straight, or rather straightened,
opinion, which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the
primal state of innocence of doxa, exists only in the objective relationship
which opposes it to heterodoxy, that is, by reference to the choice haeresis, heresy - made possible by the existence of competing possibles and
to the explicit critique of the sum total of the alternatives not chosen that
the established order implies” (169).
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To speak (or write) at all is to enter the Whorfian “agreement”
wrought into the medium itself, but it is also to enter an inherently
debatable arena, a world of “competing possibles,” of discursive in
sistences that are always partial, always warding off unwanted alter
natives. Faulknerian subjectivity - because, like all subjectivity, it is pro
duced by entry into the politically charged turbulence of discourse itselF
- cannot be conceived as a disinterested power solitarily authorizing a
pristine cosmos. It emerges instead “as a way of being as it were at stake
in the game from the outset” (Derrida, “Structure” 279). Faulkner be
comes Faulkner by what he submits to exactly as much as by what he
' rejects. To use Derrida’s terms again: without accepting the medium’s
authority there is no signification; without resisting it there is no force.
To be “in the game from the outset” does not mean remaining in it
always in the same way. One of my chief purposes in this book is to chart
Faulkner’s changing mode of participation in his culture’s “agreements.”
Between 1929 and 1942 a virtual revolution in his practice occurs, in
which a Modernist aesthetic of shock emerges, transforms itself, and
then yields to a more traditional one of recognition. He moves, formally,
from the jagged invasions of The Sound and the Fury to the sonorous
plenitude of Go Down, Moses. Whether the practice be iconoclastic or
orthodox, it articulates “Faulkner” not as inaugurative native genius but
as a set of individual performances and a certain way of activating or
resisting the larger discourses - here gender and racial as well as avantgarde and traditional - furnished by his culture. To identify William
Faulkner is to speak of an overdetermined site of interchanges in which
come into play the writer’s discrete performances, the discursive options
(accepted, refused, or transformed) of his productive culture (America in
the first half of our century), and the interpretive orientation of a reader
responding in the receptive culture of the same country fifty years later. It
all sounds not so much hopeless as dizzying.
It has not always seemed this complicated. Brooks, Vickery,
Howe, and Warren could write with a certain confidence about an author
whom they had brooded upon, sympathized with, and finally under
stood. “But the shift to this previously unknown narrator,” Brooks
claims in his introduction to Light in August (1968), “will seem like a trick
only to the reader who has failed to sense the total meaning of the work”
(xxv). I know of no astute Faulknerian in the past fifteen years who is
The word “discourse” should be understood in a concrete and plural sense. Faulkner’s
career involves a changing relation to a range of discursive practices - the nymphs and
fauns ofJin-de-sieck late Victorianism, the ferocious stylistic experiments of international
Modernism, the polysyllabic magniloquence of Southern oratory, the mean humor of
Southwestern vernacular, among others.

A COSMOS NO ONE OWNS

7

willing to speak of “the total meaning of the work,” and this not because
of timidity or laziness but because, in Derrida’s words, “If totalization no
longer has any meaning, it is . . . because the nature of the field - that is,
language and a finite language - excludes totalization. This field is in
effect that of play . . . because instead of being too large, there is some
thing missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of
substitutions” (“Structure” 289).
The missing center is of course produced and posited in every reading
of Faulkner - I too will produce my center(s) in the course of these pages
- but this center is invented as a function of the argument(s) under way.
Faulkner centers differently according to who (read: what transpersonal
hermeneutic) is looking at him. He has been changing mightily in the
past twenty years (unhke his own heroic dead figures, his Sartorises and
McCaslins, whose images tend to stay put once they are interred), and I
have been changing with him. This book is possible because of these
changes. To discuss them, however briefly, is to see that a writer’s identi
ty (his, mine) is likewise not given but produced. How else could it alter
so much over time?
The Faulkner of my first love was a towering invention of the New
Critics: formally experimental, conservative in his values, detached above
and by means of his ever-present ironies, passionate yet not partisan,
aware of everything.® We competed with each other during the 1960s and
early 1970s to see who could celebrate him best, could point out how
much further his art penetrated into the nature of things than had yet
been conceded. The critic who both culminated this genre of commen
tary and inaugurated the next one is Andre Bleikasten. His full-length
reading (Splendid 1976) of The Sound and the Fury attended with great
suppleness to the complexity of Faulkner’s formal achievement, but it
also began the process of inserting that achievement within a larger intel
lectual frame of Lacanian, structuralist, and poststructuralist values. Si
multaneously with Bleikasten came John Irwin’s intervention, in which
“Faulkner” joins the discourses of Nietzsche and Freud and emerges as a
latent structure lurking somewhere between his books rather than a set of
utterances contained within any of them. After Irwin, the opening of the
floodgates and the deluge.
A mere glance at the influential texts on Faulkner written since the
early 1980s shows that a writer centers according to the emphases of the
® Brooks and Vickery were probably the foremost shapers of Faulkner’s image in the late
1950s and 1960s, though Sartre, Aiken, Cowley, Howe, and Warren - who wrote before
them - have remained distinctive voices for articulating Faulkner’s form and value. By
1963 Millgate was able to consolidate these New Critical findings and propose a narrative
in which Faulkner’s work appeared both selectively canonical and comprehensively
mapped.
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culture doing the evaluating. The Faulkner for our decade is a writer
about race (Sundquist, Snead), gender (Wittenberg, Gwin), language and
voice (Matthews, Ross), the dynamics of reading (Wadlington, Morris),
and ideology (Porter, Moreland). Without apology, this is the Faulkner
addressed in the following chapters. Bleikasten, Matthews, Ross, and
Wadlington have especially served for me as brothers in a many-peopled
enterprise. Learning that subjective identity is a matter of affihations
rather than essences has allowed me to find my Faulkners by letting my
Faulkner go. That is why the chapters that follow reengage the same
books, also why the quarrels among the chapters are overt rather than
concealed. Intentionally diachronic, striving to avoid the twin excesses of
randomness and overpatterning, this study pursues a Faulkner whose
own cultural immersion precludes heroism. But without these remark
able novels there would have been no study at all.
The “cosmos” Faulkner would own is articulable only within a
language he cannot wholly own, and it bristles with figures unamenable
to the lineaments of his own white male subjectivity. The first two chap
ters probe the writer’s resources for articulating the Other within his
world - its women and blacks - by examining his relation to his culture’s
larger discursive practices for saying/mystifying/scapegoating their dif
ferences. Chapter 1 focuses upon gender, both laterally, in the representa
tion of women as other in the four novels under scrutiny, and vertically, as
an attempt to unearth the discursive assumptions that generate a cor
rosive portrait like Mrs. Compson in The Sound and the Fury. In Chapter
2, I turn to Faulkner’s rendering of race, and I begin by examining the
marginalizing (as well as the fantasizing) that emerges in Faulkner’s de
ployment of blacks upon his largely white canvas. This chapter concludes
with another vertical exploration, this time into the three different script
ings of Lucas Beauchamp, from magazine stories to Go Down, Moses to
Intruder in the Dust. Finally, they prepare the context for approaching (in
the second half of the study) the problematics of subjectivity at the center
of Faulkner’s texts; the shaping of the white, male subject whose codes in
turn command the figuring of both women and blacks.
Chapter 3 considers in two different ways the social construction of
identity. I begin by exploring the privileged notion of individual identity
within a Western liberal tradition. Then, through the use of conceptual
terms provided by Lacan and Althusser, a critique is provided. Subjec
tivity emerges, in this later model, as simultaneously empowering and
alienating, the interplay - within a single figure - of Imaginary affilia
tions and Symbolic insistences. Quentin Compson in The Sound and the
Fury and a variety of figures in Absalom, Absalom! embody the cultural
crossfire that is subjectivity within Faulkner’s most experimental novels.
The chapter concludes with a brief comparison of the processes of be-

A COSMOS NO ONE OWNS

9

coming Joe Christmas and Ike McCaslin in their respective novels. Con
tinuing to draw upon Lacan and Althusser, but supplementing them with
some other contemporary theorists of the “postindividualist subject,” I
propose a variety of signifying economies for thinking about the produc
tion of subjectivity. The striking shift in tone and procedure between
these two novels about training-to-be-male reveals as well the other sub
jectivity that has decisively altered in the ten years between Light in
August and Go Down, Moses: Faulkner’s.
Chapter 4 broadens further to identify the ideological field of sur
veillance and contestation within which the Faulknerian voiced body
moves and has its being.^ I draw on Foucault and Bakhtin to chart the
ways in which voice and body are figured according to the larger
culture’s norms regarding gender, class, and race. Faulkner’s texts resist
and absorb these assumptions in ways that change decisively between
1929 and 1942. This chapter probes the increasingly secure ideological
alignment of Faulkner’s work in terms, first, of his rendering of voice and
body and, second, of the reader’s transferential “contract” with the texts.
By 1942, I argue, he had lost the capacity (or perhaps the desire) to
dramatize through reader disorientation and immersion the traumatic
entry of the individual subject into the culture’s maturational field: a
traumatic entry at the core of the great Modernist texts. At the level of the
writing the hurt had ceased, the subject had sutured.
The entry of the subject into the culture, the entry of the reader into
the text: throughout my argument 1 maintain that the former is crucially
figured in the latter. Each of these chapters attends to the experience of
reading Faulkner, for if the subject’s identity is always in process, then the
act of reading powerfully activates that process. In reading we con
firm/ alter/ rethink who we are; the suasions of the text seek to realign the
traces of our minds. All writing is ideological inasmuch as it strategically
offers to its reader models of being - models that normalize and margin
alize according to determinate cultural criteria. I seek, therefore, to ex
plore these texts at the intersection of representational tactics (the posi
tioning of race and gender, the selective deployment of interiority) and
readerly experience (the subject-shaping encounter with the novels them
selves, the kinds of acknowledgment they propose or refuse).
Finally I want to ask why Faulkner has been so important to us, who
“Ideology” serves as a master term in this study, and it receives more extensive defini
tion in Chapters 2 through 4. I should say at the outset, however, that I take it to mean
not false consciousness, but rather a set of beliefs and practices that propose coherent
subjectivity by securing the individual’s alignment within a repertory of socially propa
gated roles.
I use the term “suture” in a specifically Lacanian way: “Suture ... is the way in which
the ‘subject’ at one and the same time separates itself from, or disavows, its construction
in the field of the Other, and simultaneously erects itself in the garb of coherent ‘sub
ject’ ” (Smith 75).
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the “we” is in this assertion, and what remains of any notion of coherent
subjectivity if it can be endlessly reconfigured according to different
signifying economies. Something still remains, or better: something new
emerges. For subjectivity is a notion we cannot do without. Not the
undivided subjectivity of liberal Western thought - the (white, male)
autonomous self-knowing individual - but rather the subject in process,
the subject in contestation. Beleaguered, charged with Imaginary desires,
immersed from infancy within conflicting alignments of the Symbolic
field, this subject is more likely to be a site of interior disturbance than a
locus of concerted action. Who better than Faulkner has delineated the
pathos and value of such a figure? How other than by first probing such
disturbance can any demystified notion of concerted action - of subjec
tive agency - once again be liberatingly conceived?

